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JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
Department Editor: Bernard R. Balch*
THE AVIATION HAZARD IN RADIO-TELEVISION PROGRESS

W

ITH frequency modulation and television developing as important
branches of radio broadcasting, aviation's paramount need to keep
the air free of serious hazards to air navigation is pointed up once more.
The towering antennae which mark standard radio transmitting stations
are inadequate, in terms of height, for either FM or television. Tower
heights must increase if radio and television are to progress; but in the
coming era of super-speed jets and mammoth planes air traffic already
needs the space radio towers now occupy. While the AM radio antenna
already presents a serious aviation hazard, if FM and television antennae
begin puncturing the atmosphere at greater heights, the hazard to air navigation obviously will become more serious and could eventually hamper the
advance of aviation.
The obstruction to aircraft flight has already received the attention
of every branch of government-judicial, legislative, and administrative.
Courts have petitioned to enjoin the erection and maintenance of such hazards as wooden poles with no apparent usefulness,' and of water towers 2
-useful in the extreme. No reported case involving radio antennae can be
found indicating that the antennae hazard has been handled elsewhere. State
legislatures have exercised their prerogative of authorizing municipalities
to step in by zoning laws where the aviation hazard arises,3 and the United
States Congress has made such action mandatory as a requisite to getting
federal benefits for local airport projects. 4 In the legislative area, as in the
judicial, no special treatment is accorded radio towers; yet their inclusion
in the general provision is obvious. Within the administrative framework of
the Federal Communications Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Administration there is some doubt as to whether, with the variety of powers these
agencies possess, either can actually prohibit the construction of abnormally
high radio and television antennae.
Judicially, the evolution of the conflict has been an outgrowth of real
property concepts. The development of the law of real property at a time
when the uses to which the air above the land could be put were unforeseen
gave rise to the "ad coelum" doctrine, whereby the landowner owned not
only his soil, but also everything above and below.5 In its practical applicacation this idea merely safeguarded the proprietary rights of the landowner
over the airspace immediately above his land, such as for building purposes
and for protection against encroachments of fences and trees growing on
adjoining lands. Theoretically, however, its operation was unlimited, and
for a time in the early stages of the development of air law it threatened
* Student Editor, Legal Publications Board, Northwestern University School
of Law.
1 United Airports Co. of Calif. v. Hinman, 1 Avi. 823 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
2 Roosevelt Field v. Town of North Hempstead, 88 F. Supp. 177 (E.D.N.Y.
1950).

3 Cal. Laws 1949, c. 588; Idaho Laws 1947, c. 130; Ill. Laws 1949, S.B.
No. 591; Iowa Laws 1947, c. 182; Kas. Laws 1947, c. 13; Mont. Laws 1947, c. 287;
Nev. Laws 1947, c. 205; Ore. Laws 1947, c. 205; Ore. Laws 1947, c. 542; Tex.
Laws 1947, c. 391; Wis. Laws 1947, c. 516.
4 Federal Airport Act, 60 Stat. 170 (1946), 49 U.S.C. §1102 (1948).
5 For an excellent doctrinal analysis of the maxim, "cujus est solum ejus est
usque ad coelum," see Sweeney, Adjusting the Conflicting Interests of Landowner
and Aviator in Anglo-American Law, 3 J. Am L. 329 (1932).
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to thwart the growth of air navigation. Thanks to the liberal attitude of
the courts the law has assumed a course in disregard of the literal application of the doctrine,6 although its continuous prevalence, so far as necessary to protect the landowner's rights over the "usable column of air" above
his land, remains unchallenged.
At the present time the right of an aviator to fly over the land of another,
at an altitude not involving any interference with the potential proprietary
or possessory rights of the landowner in his land, is of course unquestionable.7 Both the landowner and the aviator, then, are protected; and the extent of that protection is illustrated in the recent case of Roosevelt Field v.
Town of North Hempstead.8 Plaintiff sought to enjoin the maintenance of a
village water tower, upon the theory that it was an aeronautical hazard and a
public and private nuisance. The need for the water tower was so great that
the town council waived compliance with certain building ordinances in order
to expedite its construction. Plaintiff claimed that there had been a "taking
by defendants of property in the public domain through which plaintiffs had
freedom of transit." 0 In a balancing of equities by the court, the defendant
won easily. The town's need of a water supply was undisputed. The airfield
was shown to be of little consequence due to the fact that it was equipped to
handle only small private aircraft. Its runways were short and shabby, and
the field itself was not a lucrative business. 10 Throughout similar judicial
decisions it has been a combination of utility and necessity, as here, that has
determined the outcome."
There is no reason to suspect that a radio tower
would receive any different treatment should it ever become the subject of
litigation.
Legislative action to restrict the aviation hazards is typically of recent
date. Since 1947 a rash of zoning laws, including amendments to outdated
ones, has spread on the statutory scene. Some, like those of California 12
and Idaho,' s merely reconstructed the official state attitude toward arbitrary
condemnation of property, providing for closer consideration of actual community needs and private interests. Others, like those of Illinois 14 and
Arkansas, 15 actually prohibited or gave to municipalities the power to proSee note 11 infra.
For a summary of cases, see Note, 69 A.L.R. 317 (1930).
8 88 F. Supp. 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1950).
9 Plaintiff claimed that there would be no taking of defendant's property in
the super-adjacent air space, because its use of the upper reaches thereof had
already been taken by the exercise of such police powers under the zoning law.
The court dismissed this contention on the ground that the zoning law did not
automatically place all airspace in the vicinity of airfields in the public domain,
but only those specifically provided for by ordinance.
10 In spite of this fact, the CAA clearly regarded the tower as an aeronautical hazard, but in a letter to defendant admitted the absence of authority to
prevent the construction, and pleaded for reconsideration of the proposed construction in the interest of safeguarding lives and property. The court itself,
noting that plaintiff could have appealed the approval of the construction before
it was actually begun, was in no mood to hear arguments after the fact of
construction was already a reality.
11 In United Airports Co. of Calif. v. Hinman, 1 Avi. 823 (S.D. Cal. 1939),
the court had little difficulty awarding an injunction. Plaintiff airport owner had
a thriving business, providing facilities of the highest type for commercial and
government-owned planes. Defendant, on the other hand, had no actual interest
at stake, having erected a derrick and numerous tall poles at the periphery of
the airport for the sole purpose of hampering the airport's traffic. There was
also evidence attesting to the fact that the construction of the hazards was in
itself dangerous. The court did reserve the right to lift the injunction if defendant could prove that his use of the land in good faith necessitated the
erection of such structures.
12 Cal. Laws 1949, c. 588.
Is Idaho Laws 1947, c. 130.
14 Ill. Laws 1949, S.B. No. 591.
15 Ark. Laws 1949, c. 285.
6

7
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hibit certain types of construction above specified heights within airport
vicinities. 16 Some concern was demonstrated with respect to the right of the
state to so zone private property. In United States v. Causby 17 it was determined that the government took an easement when it used the airspace over a
chicken farm in such a way as to destroy the use of the land for that particular purpose. The Supreme Court ruled that the government must compensate the landowner.' 8 In the state zoning statutes compensation is not
provided for, but one responsible state official insists that constitutional
prohibitions against taking property without compensation are not flouted
thereby. Granting that the state contemplates, through its zoning laws, the
taking of an easement over the landowner's property, he reasons that the
constitutional prohibition yields to the inherent police power vested in the
state.' 9
The Federal Airport Act of 1946 20 takes a somewhat different approach.
It is not a zoning law; yet in order for localities to secure federal funds for
expansion and improvement of airport facilities the Civil Aeronautics Administrator must have written assurance that "the aerial approaches to such
airport will be adequately cleared and protected by removing, lowering, relocating, marking or lighting or otherwise mitigating existing airport
hazards, and by preventing the establishment or creation of future airport
hazards." 21 Here specific consideration of radio towers is present; the Administrator is authorized to seek the aid of the FCC in eliminating airport
hazards caused by such towers. 22 The Act adds, however, that the Federal
Government may share in the cost of "acquiring land or interests therein or
easements through or other interests in airspace ... " 23
Administration of the Federal Communications Act and Civil Aeronautics Act has become, with respect to the existence of radio tower aviation
hazards, a somewhat disjointed joint venture. Part of the FCC's power to
license broadcasting stations is its power to pass on the sufficiency of the
structure of the antenna, in terms of whether it is built for safety as to
passersby on the ground. 24 In addition the agency's regulations provide two
types of protection to the aviator. First is the prohibition against changes
in existing antennae without specific authorization from the Commission,
when the changes will make the antenna a certain height, or put it within
25
Second is the power to require
a certain distance from a landing area.
painting and/or illumination of radio towers which are or may become
hazards to air navigation. 26 CAA regulations provide for notice to be given
to the Administrator when either alteration or construction of structures of
a certain height and near civil airways are proposed, or if they are within
27
Hence neither agency has the flat
a certain distance from a landing area.
power to prohibit construction or alteration of radio towers.
16 The Illinois statute, for example, allows restriction of the height of any
structure "upon the relationship of one foot of height to each twenty feet of
distance from the boundary line" of the airport.
17 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
18 The case is fully considered in the note in 14 J. AIR L. 112 (1947).
19 This is taken from an opinion rendered by the attorney-general of the
State of West Virginia upon receipt of a request for information from interested
parties. 1 Avi. Rep. 19, 151.
20 60 STAT. 170 (1946), 49 U.S.C. §1102 (1948).
21 60 STAT. 176 (1946), 49 U.S.C. §1110 (1948).
22 60 STAT. 171 (1946), 49 U.S.C. §1102 (1948).
23 60 STAT. 176 (1946), 49 U.S.C. §1109(d) (1948).
24 This power is derived directly from the Communications Act of 1934,
requiring the issuance of a construction permit before issuing a license to establish the broadcasting station. 48 STAT. 1089 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §319 (1948).
25 47 CODE FED. REGS. §9.110 (1949).
26 Regulations under this heading are derived from the statute. 48 STAT.
1083 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §303(q) (1948).
27 14 CODE FED. REGS. §625.1 (1949).
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A typical FCC proceeding illustrates how these agencies, in concert,
manage to prohibit construction or alteration in spite of their supposed
handicap. Earlier this year, radio station WOR in New York City sought
permission to enlarge its broadcasting facilities by increasing the heights
of its antennae, which apparently lie in and near certain designated airways
and traffic approaches to several airports in the New York-New Jersey area.
As in all FCC proceedings, the parties were met with the need of establishing the utility of the proposed construction. 28 In this particular case, however, the chief source of contention lay in the intervention of the CAA and
other aviation interests, 29 all claiming that the new antennae would seriously
hamper air traffic in the area, and would constitute a menace to life and
property. The FCC made it clear that it was its policy to consult the CAA
30
and other interested parties wherever a possible aviation hazard is involved.
WOR had several good arguments to sustain its position that the increased
heights of the antennae would not present a serious hazard,3 ' but eventually
withdrew its application, indicating that the CAA's intervention
was more
32
than nominally successful. No official decision is available.
The fact that the regulations of the two agencies present an overlapping
of authority need not lead to the conclusion that a conflict exists. It is altogether logical that these two agencies work together, for the problem is
common to both. Granted that once they combine their efforts the applicant
for construction of an extremely high antenna has little chance of succeeding, it is equally true that adequate opportunity is provided for a hearing,
and for appeal to the judicial process.3 3 This latter remedy in all likelihood
will be unavailing, it is admitted, for the courts today favor the landowner
only under extreme conditions. Needless to say, organized legitimate aviation has highest priority in the use of airspace not previously occupied.
The city planners of today might derive great benefit from this realization. Forward-looking municipal authorities are seriously concerned with
both radio and aviation, both of which can contribute substantially to the
material progress of the city in the form of added employment and income.
Under zoning laws, cities are relatively free to select the location of new
public airports, and by intelligent cooperation with radio stations can leave
ample space for the erection of antennae without hampering air traffic.
However, in most cases the airport is an established fact. In such cases, if
the broadcaster is forced to construct antennae in locations where aviation
safety will not be endangered, his cost will be a fraction of the cost in lives
and property that would otherwise be menaced. FM and -television need not
leave the scene of aviation progress; but in any event they will be forced
to move over, whether by the courts, the legislatures or administrative
agencies.
HOWARD JOSEPH

*

28 As to the utility of the new antennae, WOR claimed its proposed expansion was designed to increase the population served by 38%, and the area served
by 212%. In addition it showed how it was performing a public service every
day by presenting religious, educational, and patriotic programs, many of
which were sustained by the broadcasting station, rather than by paid advertising.
29 Namely, the Air Transport Association of America and the Port of
New York Authority.
30 47 CODE FED. REGS. §1.377 (1949).
3' The applicant contended, among other things, that the towers had always
been considered an excellent checkpoint for pilots entering the area, and this was
backed up with testimony from pilots; there was, of course, equally convincing
testimony to the opposite effect.
32 No reference to the proceeding is to be found in the trade journals, nor
do the various law services provide a clue as to the actual reasons for the withdrawal of the application.
8 48 STAT. 1093 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §402(b) (1) (1948).
* Member, Legal Publications Board, Northwestern University Law School.

